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COUNTRY Soviet Zone of Austria

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TOPIC Soviet Documents from Vienna

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REFERENCES

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PAGES 6 ENCLOSURES (NO. & TYPE)

REMARKS

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SOURCE [REDACTED]

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The following Soviet documents were **observed** in Vienna in early March 1950:

I

No 1: Report on an inspection of the 13th Gds Mecz Div from 20 September to 2 October 1949:

State of Training of Staffs

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. Staffs are inadequately trained to cope with situations resulting from the special requirements entailed by the command of mechanized divisions (new organization, radio-directed operations).</p> <p>2. When fighting in the depth of the enemy defense, combat and special (artillery, chemical and medical) reconnaissance is insufficiently adjusted. Reconnaissance personnel are lax and do not use their brains.</p> <p>3. Planning is insufficient.</p> | <p>1. It is imperative that staffs be thoroughly familiar with the command of newly organized combat units in all phases of combat, including those involving high speed and large operational areas.</p> <p>2. Close cooperation between staffs (rear services, special troops, artillery) must be attained.</p> <p>3. Staffs must be thoroughly familiar with organization and planning of march movements.</p> <p>4. Special emphasis must be placed on AT and AA defense.</p> <p>5. Artillery staffs must be capable of employing concentrated artillery fire.</p> |
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Document No. [REDACTED]
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☒ Declassified
 Class. Change [REDACTED]
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This document is hereby regraded to **CONFIDENTIAL** in accordance with the letter of 13 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

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6. Better control of flow of supplies.
7. More command post exercises (including rear services).

II

State of Training of Troops

Attack

1. Uninterrupted cooperation, particularly in the depth of the enemy defense, is lacking. Severed communications are not restored.
2. Tactical conduct of operations is lacking in persistence and artillery support.
1. Infantry must be trained for effective commitment. Cooperation of all branches of service, particularly in fighting in the depth of the enemy defense, must be practiced.
2. Maneuvers requiring the highest measure of skill are to be conducted in cooperation with other branches of service and with the neighboring units during all phases of the operation.
3. Organization and execution of tactical exercises with neighboring troops are to be improved, particularly regarding operations in the depth of the enemy defense.

III

Defense

1. Organization and conduct of defensive operations is especially ineffective (cooperation and mutual support are lacking).
2. Distribution of forces and combat means is inappropriate when the operations penetrate the depth of the enemy defense.
3. Organization of AT and AA defense is inappropriate, particularly regarding concentration of these defensive weapons in the depth.
4. Tactical exercises up to battalion level are to be held on each combat mission prior to maneuvers (Voyenni Vestnik No. 5).
5. Endurance, persistency and audacity must be shown in all phases of operations.

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6. Infantry must be trained to fight tanks with infantry weapons (ITA).

IV

State of Combat Training

1. Officers are not skilled in leading troops (this deficiency results from a simplification of combat missions assigned, reduction defensive zones and reduced allotment of supporting weapons).
2. Routine training is given insufficient attention by officers (negligence in theoretical instruction and insufficient checking of equipment)
3. Training of officers, particularly young officers, is inaccurate. Their training is not up to date and does **not meet the standards** of modern combat.
 - a. Immediate cooperation in combat.
 - b. Tactical cooperation.
 - c. Operational cooperation
4. Officers are insufficiently trained in cooperation in the depth of the field of combat. Their knowledge is all but confined to conditions in the main line of resistance:
5. The duty roster for officers is inadequate. Self-teaching is not given the consideration it deserves as a fundamental form of officers' training.
1. World War II experiences must be studied daily and military and political knowledge must be enlarged.
2. Training of troops must be improved.
3. Knowledge on commitment and technical requirements of "machines" (presumably tanks and Si guns) must be acquired.
4. Knowledge on the new organization of the rifle and mechanized divisions must be acquired.
5. Knowledge of the technical properties and the combat employment of artillery pieces, mortars, Si guns, tanks and aircraft must be acquired.
6. Situations to be mastered in field exercises must be as complicated as possible.
7. The initiative of officers must be given greater play in the execution of operations.
8. Discipline must be more rigid.
9. Conditions of life must be improved.

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V

State of Political Indoctrination

1. Troops must be impressed with the necessity of laying down their lives for their fatherland, the Party and the Soviet Government.
2. Troops must be awake to the highest vigilance and the utmost readiness to defend in honor our home country at all costs.
3. Communists and Komsomols must be exemplary in the performance of their duties and in the conduct of life.
4. Officers must penetrate deeper into the spirit of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Self-teaching of officers must be checked.

VI

State of Combat Training

1. Troops are insufficiently trained for night commitment, use of gas mask and smoke screens.
2. Tank crews are not trained to fire while in motion.

VII

State of Preparedness

1. Practice alerts in connection with field exercises must be held.
2. Tractors and prime movers must be available for commitment.

VIII

State of Rear Services

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1. Organization and employment of the rear services must be carefully planned.
2. Knowledge of the organization of the rear services within framework of the regiment is a must.
3. Handling of supplies while marching, attacking and fighting must be acquired.
4. Actual rather than simulated supply operations must be performed in all field exercises.
5. Staffs must be employed in field exercises with all their personnel.

IX

State of Signal Communications

1. Great stress must be laid on speed in the training in command post communication and line construction. Signalmen must be capable of constructing on foot from 30 to 35 kilometers of lines per day.
2. Ninety percent of the radio operators must be specialists.

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Principal Task

1. Boarding tanks.
1. Readiness for action of the troops must be heightened.
2. Combat cooperation among units must be achieved. Cooperation among all branches of service must be practiced in joint field exercises.

The inspection was conducted by:

General of Tank and Mechanized Troops Rozhkevich

Cds Col Ovsyannikov

Cds Maj (Adm. - Tech Serv) Gupalov."

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No. 2 and 3: a. Copy of a billeting order for the personnel of Unit AIN 77 166, following the regulations laid down in the Manual for Interior Duty of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The order is immaterial. It is signed by Gds Lt Col Fayvillovich, CofS of Unit AIN 77 166, countersigned by Maj Kapikus (or Karikus), Dpty CofS, and approved in the upper left corner of the first page by Gds Col Chikin, CO of Unit AIN 77 166 and dated November 1949.

"2d A Arty Bn" is penciled in the upper right corner of the first page.

b. Copy of a questionnaire relating to an inspection of quarters of personnel of Unit AIN 77 166. Its content is immaterial. It is signed by Gds Lt Col Fayvillovich, CofS of Unit AIN 77 166.

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a. Judging from their appearance, the attached documents are drafts. They are considered authentic. The translation gives the content of the original rather than the text itself.

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b. Document No. 1 confirmed the 13th Gds Lecz Div in the Vienna area. General Rozkhevich had been mentioned in another document which was procured in

he may be Commander of Tank and Mechanized Troops at the headquarters of Central Group of Forces.

There are no definite leads for the identification of Gds Col Ovzyannikov. He may be the guards colonel (Tank Troops) of the same name who was once mentioned during the war (1944).

Gds Maj Gupelov is unknown.

c. Documents No. 2 and 3 mention AIN 77 166 which is assigned to the 106th Gds Hvy Tank Bn Regt of the 13th Gds Lecz Div. The documents also confirm Col Chikin (mentioned as guards colonel) as CO of the regiment.

Gds Lt Col Tonkopi is listed in the files as CofS of the 106th Gds Hvy Tank Bn Regt.

Gds Lt Col Fayvillovich is unknown.

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